Day argues that the meaning of "probable" is partly evaluative and partly descriptive--to say that a proposition is probable is both to recommend its assertion and to say that a certain procedure shows it to be so. The paradigm of an inductive probability judgment, which is the major concern of the book, is "The fact that all observed A's are B's makes it probable that all A's are B's." Several more complex kinds of probability judgments are distinguished and discussed in (...) detail, the author's own theory being illuminated by extensive criticism of the views of other philosophers, including Aristotle, Hume, Whewell, Mill, Peirce, Russell, Braithwaite, Carnap, and Von Wright. Philosophic problems related to induction, such as the existence of other minds and the reliability of memory, are briefly discussed. Ambitious in scope and carefully executed, the book demands, and rewards, close study.--J. R. W. (shrink)

The system of combinatory logic presented in this essay differs from usual systems of combinatory logic by its addition of Boolean operators and a theory of quantification. It differs from Fitch's previous systems in containing a strong extensionality principle. The system is claimed to provide adequate foundations for a major part of mathematical analysis. In this Report the elementary theory of natural numbers is developed in detail. An excellent introduction to Fitch's work; the exposition is clear and well developed.--J. R. (...) W. (shrink)

Day argues that the meaning of "probable" is partly evaluative and partly descriptive--to say that a proposition is probable is both to recommend its assertion and to say that a certain procedure shows it to be so. The paradigm of an inductive probability judgment, which is the major concern of the book, is "The fact that all observed A's are B's makes it probable that all A's are B's." Several more complex kinds of probability judgments are distinguished and discussed in (...) detail, the author's own theory being illuminated by extensive criticism of the views of other philosophers, including Aristotle, Hume, Whewell, Mill, Peirce, Russell, Braithwaite, Carnap, and Von Wright. Philosophic problems related to induction, such as the existence of other minds and the reliability of memory, are briefly discussed. Ambitious in scope and carefully executed, the book demands, and rewards, close study.--J. R. W. (shrink)

After describing the three main kinds of probability theories, the author presents a new logical theory of probability. Probability, for him, is a logical relation between bodies of evidence and statements. The theory is an advance over Carnap's logical theory of probability in that it is not based on a formal language with strong completeness properties. The theory is formalized in Quine's protosyntax, which has two disadvantages: first, long formulas couched in terms of a large number of defined symbols disfigure (...) the book and obscure the exposition; and secondly, it is desirable to keep our theories of inductive logic and deductive logic independent. There seems to be no reason to burden one sort of theory with the other. There is no index.--J. R. W. (shrink)

From the perspective of the old politics-right, left, and liberal—the New Left is nothing more than incoherent social commentary that should be dismissed in the manner of academic psychological explanation. But even with all the psychologizing that flourished in the interests of soothing troubled consciences the fact remains that the New Left uncovered the "process of the political." Those who remain content with the psychological explanation of the New Left and those who regard the New Left as no more than (...) a historical relic will simply ignore. Howard’s philosophical treatment of the meaning of the New Left; the Left Orthodoxy will find nothing here but further testimony to the heresy of the New Left. (shrink)